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Abstract
Near real-time monitoring of outbreak transmission dynamics and evaluation of public health interven-
tions are critical for interrupting the spread of the novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) and mitigating mor-
bidity and mortality caused by coronavirus disease (COVID-19). Avoiding or delaying the implementation
of blunt transmission mitigation policies, such as stay-at-home orders and school closures, is only sustain-
able if policy-makers base decisions of whether to relax or intensify mitigation policies based on careful
monitoring of regional and local transmission dynamics. Formulating a regional mechanistic model of
SARS-CoV-2 transmission dynamics and frequently estimating parameters of this model using streaming
surveillance data offers one way to accomplish data-driven decision making. For example, to detect an
increase in new SARS-CoV-2 infections due to relaxation of previously implemented mitigation measures
one can monitor estimates of the basic and effective reproductive numbers. In addition, frequently updated
estimates of SARS-CoV-2 transmission model parameters enables the forecasting of regional critical care
demand (e.g., hospital and intensive care unit beds). However, parameter estimation can be imprecise, and
sometimes even impossible, because surveillance data are noisy and not informative about all aspects of the
mechanistic model, even for reasonably parsimonious epidemic models. To overcome this obstacle, at least
partially, we propose a Bayesian modeling framework that integrates multiple surveillance data streams. Our
model uses both COVID-19 incidence and mortality time series to estimate our model parameters. Impor-
tantly, our data generating model for incidence data takes into account changes in the total number of tests
performed. As a result, in our model both increases/decreases in testing and increases/decreases in actual
number of infections affect observed case count changes. We apply our Bayesian data integration method
to COVID-19 surveillance data collected in Orange County, California. Our results suggest that California
Department of Public Health stay-at-home order, issued on March 19, 2020, lowered the SARS-CoV-2 ef-
fective reproductive number Re in Orange County below 1.0, which means that the order was successful in
suppressing SARS-CoV-2 infections. However, subsequent “re-opening” steps took place when thousands
of infectious individuals remained in Orange County, so Re increased to approximately 1.0 by mid-June and
above 1.0 by mid-July.
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1 Introduction
We are interested in studying and forecasting transmission dynamics of severe acute respiratory syndrome
coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) — a novel human coronavirus that is associated with high morbidity and mortal-
ity. Community spread of the virus was first reported in December 2019 in Wuhan, China, and by September
2020 infected more than 25 million individuals globally, resulting in more than 800,000 deaths (WHO, 2020a).
It is closely genetically related to SARS-CoV, which in 2003 caused the first known severe outbreak associ-
ated with a human coronavirus (Chen et al., 2020). Infection with SARS-CoV-2 causes coronavirus disease
(COVID-19), which ranges from asymptomatic or mild clinical illness in the majority of people, to Acute Res-
piratory Distress Syndrome (ARDS) and extrapulmonary complications in 5-30% of patients (Cummings and
et. al, 2020; Wu and McGoogan, 2020; Song and et. al, 2020). SARS-CoV-2, like other human coronaviruses,
is thought to be transmitted primarily by respiratory droplets. Transmission may also occur through fomites and
aerosols, with the latter being a major concern in crowded indoor settings with activities that generate aerosols
(WHO, 2020b). To suppress viral transmission, many geographic/administrative regions have implemented
mitigation measures (business closures, physical distancing, requiring facial masks, etc.). To estimate effect
of these policies and their relaxations, we develop a method that can estimate parameters of the SARS-CoV-2
transmission dynamics from relatively short time series of reported cases — positive diagnostic tests detecting
presence of SARS-CoV-2 — and deaths due to COVID-19.
Modeling and forecasting dynamics of SARS-CoV-2 transmission allows government officials to make in-
formed decisions when managing the spread of the virus. In the early stages of the pandemic, such modeling
played an important role in alerting the public about potential dangers of unmitigated virus spread (Prem and
et. al, 2020; Ferguson and et. al, 2020; Davies et al., 2020). Differences in mitigation strategies, surveillance
efforts, and population characteristics across countries and even across different regions within one country
prompted development of regional modeling of SARS-CoV-2 transmission. For example, Anderson and et. al
(2020), Miller and et. al (2020), and Morozova et al. (2020) provide great examples of rigorous data-driven
regional modeling. However, neither national nor subnational/regional modelers fully integrate all surveillance
data available to them. In particular, incorporating case incidence data into inference proved particularly prob-
lematic, because the number of cases depends not only on the unobserved number of infections, but also on the
number of diagnostic tests performed, which varies significantly temporally and spatially. However, even with
delayed reporting, positive diagnostic tests (cases) are the earliest indicators of changing disease dynamics,
so taking advantage of this source of information is important for producing timely forecasts and for policy
decision making.
In this paper, we show how to fit a mechanistic model of SARS-CoV-2 spread to incidence and mortality
time series, while accounting for time-varying number of diagnostic tests performed. The mechanistic model
is a fairly standard ordinary differential equation (ODE) model that describes changes in the proportions of the
population residing in model compartments (e.g., susceptible and infectious compartments). Death counts are
modeled with a negative binomial distribution that allows for overdispersion often observed in surveillance data
— a standard practice in infectious disease epidemiology. Our main innovation is the model for cases, where we
use a flexible beta-binomial distribution, whose mean is a product of the total number of tests performed and a
non-linear function of unobserved infections modeled by the ODE model. The “beta” part of the beta-binomial
distribution ensures that our estimates are not unduly influenced by large fluctuations of COVID-19 diagnostic
test positivity fractions.
We first validate our model using simulated data, demonstrating importance of adjusting for the number
of tests performed for transmission parameter inference. Next, we fit our compartmental model to COVID-19
surveillance data collected in Orange County, California. Orange County is the sixth most populous county in
the United States of America (U.S.A.), with an estimated 3.18 million inhabitants as of 2019 (United States
Census Bureau, 2020). The third confirmed COVID-19 case in U.S.A. was identified in Orange County on
January 26, 2020 (NBC Bay Area, 2020), though community transmission following this case in a traveler
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from Wuhan, China was limited. In mid-March cases in OC began to surge, triggering major public health
interventions, including a mandatory shelter in place order (Orange County Health Care Agency, 2020). A
state-wide shelter in place order was put in place the following day (Gavin Newson, Governor of California,
2020a). Cases then flattened and remained at relatively low levels until the public health and executive orders
were relaxed beginning May 4 (Gavin Newson, Governor of California, 2020b). In June cases locally, state-
wide, and nation-wide surged. In late June the Governor ordered indoor dining and bars to close again in an
attempt to curb the growth of cases (NBC Los Angeles, 2020).
To account for changes in SARS-CoV-2 transmission dynamics due to implementation and subsequent
relaxation of mitigation measures, we analyze three 36 day time periods separately: March 31 – May 05,
May 06 – June 10, and June 11 – July 16. The first period overlaps with the state-wide stay-at-home order.
Stay-at-home order termination and fast re-opening of most businesses happened in the second and third time
periods. Our analysis shows that the basic reproduction number has been steadily increasing after the stay-at-
home order ended. On a positive note, changes in parameters controlling our surveillance model for observed
numbers of positive COVID-19 diagnostic tests seem to reflect changing testing guidelines that moved from
testing mostly symptomatic individuals to casting a wider testing “net” over the Orange County population. In
addition to estimating transmission and observation model parameters, we report the inferred latent incidence
and prevalence and retrospectively evaluate ability of our model to produce short-term forecasts.
2 Methods
2.1 Data
We start with time series of daily tests (positive and negative), case counts (positive tests), and deaths observed
over some time period of interest. Daily resolution is too noisy due to reporting delays, weekend effect, etc., so
we aggregate/bin the three types of counts in 3 day intervals. We use 3 day aggregation, because it allows us
to analyze shorter time periods than more standard weekly aggregation, while still smoothing over decline of
surveillance reporting during weekends and other data artifacts. Figure 1 shows such a collection of aggregated
time series for Orange County, CA, corresponding to the observation period spanning days between March
31, 2020 and July 16, 2020. The data was compiled from anonymized individual test results provided by the
Orange County Health Care Agency (OCHCA). We define cases as either confirmed or presumed COVID-19
diagnoses that have been officially reported to the state public health authorities. We used specimen collection
dates and dates of deaths to tabulate test, case, and death counts. If an individual was tested more than once,
we used only the first positive test of the individual for construction of test and case time series. We denote
the vector of binned tests by T = (T1, . . . ,TL), the vector of case counts by Y = (Y1, . . . ,YL), and the vector of
deaths by M = (M1, . . . ,ML), where counts Tl, Yl, and Ml are aggregated over a 3 day interval indexed by l and
L is the total number of these intervals. We do not model changes in the numbers of tests performed. Rather, we
condition on test counts in the specification of the sampling model for the vector of case counts, which describes
the probability of the observed case count given the observed number of tests and unobserved/latent incidence
of cases over each time interval. To formulate this data generating model and its companion for the vector
of death counts M, we first need a model for latent trajectories of incidence and prevalence of SARS-CoV-2
infections.
2.2 Transmission model
To model latent incidence and prevalence trajectories, we divide all individuals in a population of interest (e.g.,
population of Orange County, CA) into 6 compartments: S = susceptible individuals, E = infected, but not yet
infectious individuals, Ie = infectious individuals at early stages of infection, Ip = infectious individuals who
progressed in their infection stage, R = recovered individuals, D = individuals who died due to COVID-19.
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Figure 1: COVID-19 surveillance data from Orange County, CA. The figure shows 3 day period counts of tests,
cases (positive tests), and reported deaths due to COVID-19.
Possible progressions of an individual through the above compartments are depicted in Figure 2. We model the
time-evolution of the proportions of individuals occupying the above compartments with a set of deterministic
ordinary differential equations (ODEs). For simplicity, we assume a closed and homogeneously mixing popu-
lation, although it is possible to relax these assumptions, and we also assume that recovery confers immunity to
subsequent infection over the duration of the modeling period. Let X(t) =
(
S (t), E(t), Ie(t), Ip(t),R(t),D(t)
)T
de-
note the population proportions in each compartment at time t, and let X(t0) = x0 denote the population propor-
tions at time t0, the start of the modeling period. By convention, we model the population at risk, i.e., those indi-
viduals who may still move throughout the model compartments. Hence, we take R(t0) = R0 = D(t0) = R0 = 0
and normalize X(t) so that X(t)T1 = 1. Since we want to fit this model to incidence data, it is convenient to also
keep track of cumulative fractions of the population that experience transitions between compartments from
t0 to t: N(t) =
(
NS E(t),NEIe(t), NIeIp(t),NIeR(t),NIpR(t),NIpD(t)
)T
. To describe mathematically how vectors
X(t) and N(t) change through time, we first define rates of transitions between compartments, with possible
transitions corresponding to the arrows in Figure 2:
λS E(Ie, Ip, S ) = β(Ie + δIp)S ,
λIpR(Ip) = (1 − η)νpIp,
λEIe(E) = γE,
λIpD(Ip) = ηνpIp,
λIeIp(Ie) = νeIe, (1)
where β is the infection rate, δ is the fraction by which progressed infectious individuals become less infectious
than individuals at the early stage of infection, 1/γ is the mean latent period duration, 1/νe is the mean early
infectious period duration, 1/νp is the mean progressed infectious period duration, and η is the probability of
transitioning from Ip to death, rather than to recovery. We do not estimate δ and fix it to 0.8 in all our analyses.
4
Equipped with the population-level transition rates, we are ready to define ODEs for our model:
dS
dt
= −λS E(Ie, Ip, S ),
dE
dt
= λS E(Ie, Ip, S ) − λEIe(E),
dIe
dt
= λEIe(E) − λIeIp(Ie),
dIp
dt
= λIeIp(Ie) − λIpR(Ip) − λIpD(Ip),
dR
dt
= λIpR(Ip),
dD
dt
= λIpD(Ip),
dNS E
dt
= λS E(Ie, Ip, S ),
dNEIe
dt
= λEIe(E),
dNIeIp
dt
= λIeIp(Ie),
dNIpR
dt
= λIpR(Ip),
dNIpD
dt
= λIpD(Ip),
(2)
subject to initial conditions X(t0) = x0 and N(t0) = 0, where x0 = (S 0, E0, Ie,0, Ip,0,R0,D0) are initial compart-
ment proportions. We set R0 = 0 and D0 = 0, because these proportions do not play a role in future dynamics
of the epidemic, leaving S 0, E0, Ie,0, and Ip,0 as free model parameters. Hence, our model describes the forward
time evolution of the population still at risk. Setting R0 = 0 and D0 = 0 works well at the start of the epidemic,
but complicates parameter interpretation as the sizes of R and D compartments become non-negligible. We will
make the initial concentrations R0 and D0 free parameters in the future revisions of the model.
The above equations are redundant, and typically only the prevalence ODEs in the left column are used
in mathematical modeling. However, the cumulative incidence/transition representation of the model, shown
by the ODEs in the right column, is useful for statistical modeling of infectious disease dynamics (Breto´ and
Ionides, 2011; Ho et al., 2018). In practice, we solve the subset of the above ODEs that are needed to track X(t)
and the parts of N(t) that “connect” our transmission model to data. We proceed to make this connection in the
next subsection.
S E Ie Ip
D
R
Figure 2: Model diagram depicting possible progressions between infection states. The model compartments
are as follows: susceptible (S ), infected, but not yet infectious (E), early infectious (Ie), progressed infectious
(Ip), recovered (R), and deceased (D).
2.3 Surveillance model
Recall that we would like to fit our transmission model to two time series: numbers of new cases and deaths
reported during some pre-specified time periods (e.g., 3 day periods or weeks). First, we assume that conditional
on the fractions of latent transitions between compartments N(t), case and death counts are independent of each
other, because they are just noisy realizations of information encoded by N(t). Similarly, conditional on N(t),
case counts are independent across time intervals and death counts are independent across time intervals. This
leaves us with formulating models for cases and deaths in each individual observation interval.
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Consider the number of deaths M` observed in time interval (t`−1, t`], where ` = 1, . . . , L. Since our ODEs
track the latent cumulative fraction of deaths NIpD(t`), we can compute ∆NIpD(t`) = NIpD(t`)−NIpD(t`−1) — the
latent fraction of the population that died in the interval (t`−1, t`]. We model the observed death count M` as a
realization from the following negative binomial distribution:
M` ∼ Negative binomial
(
µD` = ρ × N × ∆NIpD(t`), σ2` = µD` (1 + µD` /φ)
)
, (3)
where N is the population size, µD` and σ
2
` are the mean and variance of the negative binomial distribution,
ρ ∈ [0, 1] is the mean death detection probability, and φ > 0 is an overdispersion parameter. Informally, our
mortality model says that, on average, the observed number of deaths, M`, is a fraction of the true death count
estimated by the model, N × ∆NIpD(t`), with some noise due to underreporting and sampling variability.
Next, we develop a model for the number of positive tests (cases), Y`, observed in time interval (t`−1, t`].
We start with a simple binomial model with per-test positivity probability ψ`:
Y` | ψ` ∼ Binomial(T`, ψ`),
where T` is the number of COVID-19 diagnostic tests administered during time interval (t`−1, t`]. We could
proceed to modeling ψ` as a deterministic function of latent incidence, but observed variation in estimated
positivity probabilities cannot be explained by changes in incidence alone. Variable testing guidelines, test
shortages, and other factors must be at play. We use another layer of randomness to account for these unob-
served factors affecting positivity probabilities and assume that the positivity probability in interval (t`−1, t`]
follows the following Beta distribution:
ψ` ∼ Beta
(
κµC` , κ
(
1 − µC`
))
, (4)
where κ is an overdispersion parameter and µC
`
is the mean test positivity probability. We assume that mean test
positivity log-odds is a linear function of the unobserved log-odds-transformed fraction of the population that
transitioned from early to progressed infectiousness, ∆NIeIp(t`) = NIeIp(t`) − NIeIp(t`−1) in interval (t`−1, t`]:
log
 µC`1 − µC
`
 = α0 + α1 log ( ∆NIeIp(t`)1 − ∆NIeIp(t`)
)
, (5)
where α0 > 0 and 0 < α1 < 1. This somewhat arbitrary functional form nonetheless ensures that on av-
erage probability of detecting a COVID-19 case grows with the population incidence, as shown in Figure 3.
Parameters α0 and α1 can be thought of as reflecting testing guidelines. A model with α0 = 0 and α1 = 1.0
(i.e., µC
`
= ∆NIeIp(t`)) says that in interval (t`−1, t`] testing is done approximately by sampling individuals uni-
formly at random, so that the positivity probability over time interval ` is equal to the fraction of the population
that transitions from early to progressed infection. As we increase α0 above 0 and decrease α1 below 1, the
model mimics preferential testing of individuals who are more likely to have severe infection (e.g., testing only
individuals with certain symptoms).
We can streamline our surveillance model for case counts by integrating over positivity probabilities and
arriving at the following Beta-binomial distribution:
Y` | µC` , κ ∼ Beta-binomial
(
T`, κµC` , κ
(
1 − µC`
))
. (6)
Properties of the Beta-binomial distribution imply that E(Y`) = T`×µC` . This means that our model predicts that
on average cases grow linearly with the number of tests administered. Keeping in mind our assumed relation-
ship between µC
`
and ∆NIeIp(t`), the average number of cases also grows with accumulation of new infections.
Furthermore, the variance of the fraction of tests that are positive under the beta-binomial distribution is
Var(Y`/T` | T`, µC` , κ) =
µC
`
(1 − µC
`
)
T`
(
1 +
T` − 1
κ + 1
)
,
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Figure 3: Relationship between COVID-19 diagnostic test positivity probability and latent incidence in the
population defined by equation (5).
where the variance under an analogous pure binomial model would be µC
`
(1−µC
`
)/T`. Hence, the overdispersion
parameter, κ, can be interpreted in terms of the excess variance of the beta-binomial model relative to a pure
binomial distribution. In summary, our Beta-binomial distribution for observed case counts ensures that we do
not confuse increase in testing for increase in COVID-19 incidence and implicitly allows for heterogeneity in
the mean test positivity probability.
2.4 Putting all the pieces into a Bayesian model
We are now ready to describe our inferential Bayesian procedure. First, we slightly re-parameterize our model
by replacing β with a basic reproductive number R0 = β
(
1/νe + δ/νp
)
, obtained as the dominant eigenvalue
of the next–generation matrix for our ODEs linearized about the disease–free equilibrium state (Diekmann
et al., 2010). In addition, we parameterize initial compartment fractions as S 0, E0 = (1 − I˜0)(1 − S 0), Ie,0 =
I˜e,0 I˜0(1−S 0), and Ip,0 = (1− I˜e,0)I˜0(1−S 0), where I˜0 =
(
Ie,0 + Ip,0
)
/ (1 − S 0) is a fraction of infected individuals
who are infectious and I˜e,0 = Ie,0/
(
Ie,0 + Ip,0
)
is a fraction of early stage infectious individuals out of all
infectious individuals in both early and progressed stages. Next, we collect all our model parameters into a
vector θ = (S 0, I˜0, I˜e,0,R0, γ, νe, νp, η, ρ, φ, α0, α1, κ). Our probabilistic construction described above implies
that the likelihood function — probability of observing incidence and mortality data — can be written in the
following way:
L(M,Y | θ) = L(M | θ)L(Y | θ) =
L∏
`=1
Pr(M` | θ) Pr(Y` | θ),
where Pr(Ml | θ) and Pr(Yl | θ) are Negative-binomial and Beta-binomial probability mass functions defined by
equations (3) and (6) respectively.
We encode available information about our model parameters in a prior distribution with density pi(θ). We
assume that all parameters are a priori independent and list our prior assumptions in Table 1. Since our model
is highly parametric, we rely on informative prior distributions that we parameterize using existing scientific
studies. We base all our inferences and predictions on the posterior distribution of all model parameters:
pi(θ |M,Y) ∝ L(M,Y | θ)pi(θ). (7)
We approximate this posterior using Hamiltonian Monte Carlo implemented in the Stan probabilistic program-
ming language for fitting Bayesian models, version 2.21.2 (Carpenter et al., 2017; Stan Development Team,
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Table 1: Model parameters and prior distributions.
Parameter Interpretation Prior Prior Median (90% Interval)
S 0 Initial susceptible fraction Beta(983, 2.7) 1 − 2.4 × 10−3
(
1 − 6 × 10−3, 1 − 7.2 × 10−4
)
I˜0 Fraction of initial infected who are infectious Beta(41.3, 17.26) 0.71 (0..6, 0.8)
I˜e,0 Fraction of initial early stage infectious individuals Beta(24.43, 27.02) 0..47 (0..36, 0.59)
R0 Basic reproduction number Log-normal(-0.25, 0.7) 0.77 (0.25, 2.41)
1/γ Mean latent period? Log-normal(0, 0.22) 1 (0.7, 1.44)
1/νe Mean early infectious period? Log-normal(0, 0.22) 1 (0.7, 1.44)
1/νp Mean progressed infectious period? Log-normal(0, 0.22) 1 (0.7, 1.44)
η Probability of death/infection fatality ratio (IFR) Beta(1.5, 200) 0.006 (0.0009, 0.02)
ρ Mean death detection rate Beta(8, 2) 0.82 (0.57, 0.96)
1/
√
φ Overdispersion in observed deaths Exponential(1) 0.69 (0.05, 3)
α0 intercept in the linear model of test positivity log-odds (5) Truncated-normal(4, 2) 4.06 (1.07, 7.31)
α1 slope in the linear model of test positivity log-odds (5) Beta(3, 1) 3.91 (1.6, 6.2)
1/
√
κ Overdispersion in test positivity Exponential(1) 0.69 (0.05, 3)
? Mean latent and infectious period durations are parameterized in weeks.
?? These priors are used only for the initial model fit at the beginning of the epidemic. In models fit to later stages of the epidemic, method of
moments estimators are used to create a prior based on the posterior of the relevant compartments on the relevant day in the previous model.
2020). We used four Markov chains in parallel to draw a total of 8,000 posterior samples with the first 4,000
discarded as warmup. Convergence and mixing was assessed using potential scale reduction factors, effective
posterior sample sizes, and traceplots of model parameters. Model code and data are available at the following
GitHub repository: https://github.com/vnminin/uci_covid_modeling/.
3 Results
We used two simulation scenarios to validate our modeling approach and to examine whether accounting for
time-varying testing makes a difference (see Supplementary Section A). We first simulated 1,000 datasets from
our data generating model and obtained posterior distributions of our model parameters based on these data
sets. In the second simulation study, we examined the effect of ignoring variability in the number of tests
conducted over time. The results of both simulation studies are summarized in Supplementary Figures A2–A3
and Supplementary Table A4. In the first simulation study, low mean absolute errors and coverage of credible
intervals close to the nominal 95% demonstrate reasonable performance of our inferential procedure. The
second simulation study shows that ignoring fluctuations in diagnostic tests indeed biases parameter estimation.
In particular, 95% credible intervals for basic reproductive number R0 contains the true value of this parameter
only in 8% of simulations ( Table A4). This result highlights the importance of appropriately adjusting for the
number of tests performed when analyzing case counts. We show summaries of the priors and posteriors for
both models fit to a single simulated data set, depicted in Figure A1, in Figures A4 and A5. These summaries
suggest some of our parameters may be weakly identifiable, if at all. For instance, the prior and posterior
summaries look nearly identical for mean durations of stay in E and Ie compartments. Therefore, close attention
needs to be paid to specifying meaningful informative prior distributions for these parameters.
Next, we apply our Bayesian inferential procedure to COVID-19 surveillance data collected in Orange
County, California. To account for time-varying disease dynamics and surveillance effort, we analyze sepa-
rately three 36 day long time periods: March 31–May 05, May 06–Jun 10, and June 11–July 16. The first
period overlaps with the state-level stay-at-home order — the most stringent virus transmission containment
effort implemented in California. The second period corresponds to a series of restriction relaxations imple-
mented by the California four-stage reopening roadmap. During the third chosen period a mix of relaxations and
restrictions occurred, with some businesses opening, universal masking orders, re-closures of in-door dining,
and a re-instatement of the stay-at-home order. Our main interest is in quantifying differences in transmission
dynamics and surveillance efforts among the three chosen periods. Three sets of prior and posterior distribu-
tional summaries of all model parameters are available in Appendix Figures B1–B3. Below we walk the reader
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through the most important parameter estimation results in detail.
The upper-left plot of Figure 4 shows prior and posterior distributions of the basic reproduction number
(R0) for Orange County in the three time intervals. The basic reproduction number is estimated to be near or
under 1.0 in April and May, around 1.0 in May and June, and above 1.0 in June and July. Note that since the
effective reproductive number can be computed as Re(t) = S (t)R0 and the proportion of susceptibles in Orange
County was still close to 1.0 before June 2020, we expect Re(t) to be only slightly smaller than our calculated
R0 in the first two periods. Indeed, the middle plot in the top row of Figure 4 demonstrates that the posterior
distributions of S (t) at the end of these periods are close to 1.0, while the third period ended with 2–8% drop
in susceptibles. The posterior distributions of Re(t) are shown in the upper-right plot of Figure 4. The leftmost
plot in the middle row shows percent change of Re(t) between the first and second and second and third periods.
Posterior medians of this percent change say that transmission increased by 18% in the second period and by
24% in the third period. It is of interest if Re > 1.0, because that would indicate that the number of new
infections should be increasing in the future. We compute a Bayes factor in favor of the hypothesis that Re > 1
— BFRe>1 = Pr(M,Y | Re > 1)/Pr(M,Y | Re ≤ 1) — the probability of observing the data in hand under
the assumption that Re > 1 divided by the probability of observing the data in hand under the assumption that
Re ≤ 1. The Bayes factors for May 5, June 10, and July 16 are 0.22, 0.63, and 30, respectively. This indicates
that in the latest time period the cases and deaths data are much more likely under the assumptions that Re > 1
than under the alternative of Re ≤ 1, providing strong evidence in favor of Re > 1 (Kass and Raftery, 1995).
For the earlier time periods, the Bayes factors provide compelling evidence neither in favor of Re > 1 nor in
favor of Re ≤ 1.
Prior and posterior distributions of the infection-to-fatality ratio (IFR), represented by the parameter η in our
model, are depicted in the middle plot of the second row in Figure 4. The most recent 95% Bayesian credible
interval is (0.002–0.013), meaning that somewhere between 0.2% and 1.3% of all SARS-CoV-2 infections
result in death. The estimated IFR for the most recent period is lower than the previous two periods, but all
3 posterior distributions largely agree with previously reported IFR plausible ranges (Verity and et. al, 2020;
Meyerowitz-Katz and Merone, 2020). The rightmost plot in the second row and the leftmost plot in the third
row of Figure 4 depict the prior and posterior distributions of parameters related to testing guidelines. Recall
that a setting with α0 = 0 and α = 1.0 corresponds to testing individuals in the population uniformly at random.
The posterior distributions of these parameters indicate that, over time, α0 is decreasing, while α1 is increasing,
suggesting that testing is becoming closer to sampling uniformly at random. Still, even in the latest period,
the value of α0 is far from zero, which means that infected individuals are much more likely to get tested than
susceptibles. Prior and posterior distributions of the death reporting probability — the model parameter we
call ρ — are shown in the middle plot of the last row in Figure 4. Our results show that 52% to 97% of all
deaths are reported in each observation period, similarly to our prior assumption. We assess the under-reporting
factor of cases by taking the ratios of the observed to estimated cumulative incidence counts at the end of each
time period. The resulting posterior distributions are displayed in the lower-right plot of Figure 4, showing that
reported cases underestimate the actual number of infections by at most 10 fold.
We now turn to the estimated latent dynamics of the SARS-CoV-2 transmission in Orange County. First, we
plot posterior medians and Bayesian credible intervals of the latent cumulative death counts (NI pD(t)) between
March and July 2020, using three credibility levels: 50%, 80%, and 95% (top row of Figure 5). We also extend
the time horizon by 4 weeks into the future in all plots of this figure to provide our predictions about the SARS-
CoV-2 spread. Reported death counts are shown as black bars in the same plots. When available, the reported
counts for days in the prediction region are shown as light-gray bars. These bars show our predictions to be
quite accurate in all the time periods, but with a tendency to underestimate in the initial time period, likely
due to the ending of the stay at home order. Note that we expect that predicted latent deaths to be greater than
reported deaths, due to underreporting.
The middle row of Figure 5 shows the posterior distributions of cumulative number of infections (NS E(t))
occurred in Orange County between March and July 2020. We show observed cumulative incidences as black
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Figure 4: Prior and posterior distributions of the basic reproduction number R0, proportion of susceptibles at the
end of each period, effective reproduction number Re(t), percent change in transmission (i.e., change in Re(t)),
infection-to-fatality ratio (IFR), parameters of the beta-binomial observational model for cases, α0, and α1, and
death reporting probability ρ, and case underreporting factor. For each parameter, we report three posterior
distributions corresponding to the three observation periods. The shaded areas are mirrored posterior density
plots. Black circles correspond to prior/posterior medians. Black vertical lines indicate 50%, 80%, and 95%
Bayesian credible intervals.
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bars in the same plots. As before, the light-gray bars indicate observed incidence in the predicted period. The
bottom row of Figure 5 shows progression of SARS-CoV-2 prevalence (total number of infectious individuals
at one particular time, Ie(t) + Ip(t)) over the time period under study. These plots show that SARS-CoV-2
prevalence increased approximately 10 fold between April and July. The three prevalence plots disagree about
the level of prevalence for overlapping intervals, by a factor of roughly 2. This disagreement is mostly likely
a result of a model misspecification. For example, our unrealistic assumption of a constant infection rate, or
equivalently R0, in each observation period may be at fault here.
Finally, we turn to model diagnostics and model-based forecasting of observable quantities. Let us first
look at our model-based predictions of reported deaths in the top row of Figure 6. Conceptually, you can think
about these predictions as counts that are generated by first sampling all parameters of our model from the
posterior distribution, plugging them into the mortality negative binomial distribution, and sampling from this
distribution at each time point of interest. As in Figure 5, we use three credibility levels in Figure 6. The fact
that during the observation time interval the reported death counts fall within 95% credible interval of their
model-based predictive distributions indicates that our model fits the Orange County mortality data reasonably
well. The credible intervals outside of the observation interval summarize our four week ahead probabilistic
forecasts of mortality. When available, the observed deaths from the forecasting period are presented as light-
gray bars. In the first time period, our forecast underestimated the actual number of observed deaths; however,
our accuracy was much greater in the second and third periods.
Since forecasting cases is impossible without knowing how many tests will be conducted in the future, we
focus on positivity fraction (cases divided by the total number of tests) instead. To generate predictive dis-
tribution of the positivity fraction we use model parameters, drawn from the posterior distribution, to generate
realizations from the beta distribution shown in equation (4). Again, the observed positivity fractions fall within
95% credible intervals of their posterior predictive distribution. Our forecasts also perform well in the first time
period, but are quite inaccurate in the second time period, where a major rise in testing positivity began just
after the model training period. Our model also did not forecast decline in test positivity in the second half of
July and beginning of August. Although our model did not forecast well test positivity in the second and third
periods due to our constant R0 assumption, moving the 36 day long observation period into the future would
allow our model to pick up on increases and decreases in transmission.
4 Discussion
We developed a Bayesian model that integrates information from incidence and mortality data. Our approach
combines a realistic, but not overly complex, ODE-based compartmental model of SARS-CoV-2 transmission
dynamics and a carefully constructed surveillance model for cases and deaths. Importantly, our method ac-
counts for variability in the number of SARS-CoV-2 diagnostics tests across time, thus ensuring that we do not
confuse increases in testing with increases in incidence. In supplementary simulations, we have also shown that
failing to account for changes in testing can lead to poor estimation of the basic reproduction number R0. In
our application of the model to Orange County, CA surveillance data shows that the SARS-CoV-2 transmission
steadily increased after the California state-wide stay-at-home order ended. The model allowed us to estimate
IFR, magnitude of incidence and death underreporting, and changes in prevalence in Orange County, CA. Ret-
rospective analysis showed that our model produced reasonable forecasts, but they were off during periods
when SARS-CoV-2 transmission dynamics and mitigation policies changed rapidly.
Our primary focus in this work was on developing a framework for integrating multiple data streams into
a transmission model. However, there are a number of extensions we could pursue to improve the realism of
the assumed transmission dynamics and strengthen the model’s forecasting skill. Our model assumes that the
population of interest is well mixed and that all individuals in the population infect others and get infected at
the same per capita rate. In fact, the actual SARS-CoV-2 transmission process is much more complex because
11
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Figure 5: Latent and observed cumulative death (top row) and incidence (middle row) trajectories and latent
prevalence trajectories (bottom row) in Orange County, CA. Columns correspond to the three observation time
intervals. Solid blue lines show point-wise posterior medians, while shaded areas denote 50%, 80%, and 95%
Bayesian credible intervals. Black and gray bars denote observed/training and left-out/test data. Note that the
posterior predictive distributions are of latent deaths and cases are not forecasts of their observed counterparts.
Forecasts are plotted in Figure 6.
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individuals come into contact with each other based on their geographical and social network proximity. Fur-
thermore, it is well established that COVID-19 disease progression process depends on the individual’s age and
possibly other characteristics (Kim and et. al, 2020; Bhargava and et. al, 2020; Petrilli and et. al, 2020). Fortu-
nately, compartmental models can be extended to account for these complexities. For example, we can stratify
each model compartment by age and geographical location, as is commonly done in epidemiological modeling
(Li and Brauer, 2008; Van den Driessche, 2008). Fitting models with complex transmission heterogeneities is
challenging because of a large number of model parameters we need to estimate. Hence, fitting increasingly
granular models requires richer surveillance data, e.g., cases, negative tests, and deaths stratified by age and
geographical location. For this reason, it is often preferable to work with line lists of positive and negative tests,
which often include the geographic and demographic information needed to fit such models.
Changes in control/mitigation measures and in human behavior make SARS-CoV-2 transmission dynamics
time-varying. In our Orange County, CA surveillance data analysis, we have addressed this complication by
breaking the observation time interval into smaller sub-intervals and by allowing all our model parameters to
vary across these sub-intervals. However, a more optimal solution would keep most of the parameters constant
across time, while allowing a small number of parameters to be time-varying. To address changes in human
behavior and resulting changes in contact rates, it is important to allow for temporal variability in R0. Anderson
and et. al (2020) and Miller and et. al (2020) use parametric approaches to model effects of mitigation measures
on R0. It would be interesting to try Bayesian nonparametric approaches within our framework (Xu et al.,
2016; Tang et al., 2019), or a semi-parametric approach that combines together parametric and non-parametric
components. Other aspects of the model where time-varying dynamics could reasonably be incorporated are
the IFR and the mean test positivity and death detection rate in the surveillance model. Additional extensions to
time-varying dynamics should be implemented thoughtfully, with particular attention paid to controlling model
complexity and to model evaluation.
Our general modeling framework could be made useful for anticipating and preparing for a surge in COVID-
19 hospitalizations by adding compartments for hospitalization and intensive care admission. Daily counts of
the numbers of people who are hospitalized or receiving intensive care are available in Orange County, CA
and in many other geographic locations. Adding additional compartments corresponding to hospitalization and
intensive care would allow us to incorporate these counts into our surveillance model.
In this paper, we have sidestepped the thorny issue of reporting delays by restricting our analyses to time
periods in which the data have stabilized. Hence, our analyses should be robust to reporting delays so long as
we have either “run out the clock” on the extent of the delays or there are reporting delays do not differ between
positive and negative COVID-19 diagnostic tests. A useful set of extensions that would make our model more
useful for real-time surveillance involve estimating the reporting delay distribution (Ho¨hle and an der Heiden,
2014; Stoner and Economou, 2019) and using this distribution in our surveillance model.
Finally, we would like to point out that our deterministic representation of the latent epidemic process could
be substituted for a fully stochastic model where the latent epidemic is represented as a Markov jump process,
albeit with some loss of computational efficiency. In our large population setting, this could be achieved via
simulation-based methods (Breto´ et al., 2009; Andrieu et al., 2010; Dukic et al., 2012), data augmentation
(Pooley et al., 2015; Nguyen-Van-Yen et al., 2020), or a variety of approximations of the latent stochastic
epidemic process (Lekone and Finkensta¨dt, 2006; Cauchemez and Ferguson, 2008; Fintzi et al., 2020). Scaling
our model to state or national level could be done by analyzing multiple counties independently or by building a
Bayesian hierarchical model that would allow borrowing information among counties. An even more ambitious
undertaking would be allowing importation/exportation events across county lines, as was done by Pei and
Shaman (2020). We hope that our methodology and other works in this spirit, along with better quality of
surveillance data, will contribute to statistically rigorous COVID-19 epidemic modeling.
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A Model validation and simulation study
To validate the model we generated one thousand simulated sets of observed cases and tests based on actual
tests performed in Orange County, CA during April 14th to May 19th. This period was chosen because there
was a large increase in the number of tests during this time period. An example of one of the one thousand
data sets we simulated is displayed in Figure A1. We then fit two separate versions of the model to each of the
simulated data sets. The first version of the model is the model described in the main text, to which we refer to
as the “Test-Aware” model. The second model used a negative binomial distribution to model cases, much as
a negative binomial distribution is used to model deaths, and did not account for number of tests. This second
model will be referred to as the “No Tests” model. The parameters used to simulate the data sets, as well as
the priors used in fitting the models are described in the tables below (Tables A1, A2, and A3). Summaries
of priors and posteriors of all model parameters from both models fit to the sample data set in Figure A1 are
displayed in Figures A4 and A5.
For each parameter and model we calculated three metrics to assess model performance. To examine bias
we used relative absolute difference (Figure A2), calculated as the absolute difference between the posterior
median and the true parameter value, divided by the true parameter value. We also calculated relative credible
interval width (Figure A3). Relative credible interval width was calculated as the difference between the 97.5
and 2.5 quantiles of the posterior distribution divided by the true parameter value. Finally, we summarized
coverage of model parameters, defined as the total number of simulations for which the 95% credible interval
contained the true parameter value divided by the total number of simulations times one hundred, in Table A-
4. Overall the Test-Aware model has lower median relative absolute error (Figure A2), with median credible
interval widths occasionally wider than the No Tests model (Figure A3). Across the board, the Test-Aware
model has coverage that is as good as or better than the No Tests model (Table A4). Of particular interest is
the coverage for the basic reproductive number R0. The Test-Aware model covered the true value of R0 in 98%
of simulations, while the No Tests model coverage of R0 was only 8%, supporting our decision to incorporate
testing data into our surveillance model.
Table A1: Parameters used to simulate one thousand data sets.
Parameter Interpretation Value
S 0 initial susceptible fraction 1 − 3.1 × 10−3
I˜0 Fraction of initial infected who are infectious 0.69
I˜e,0 Fraction of initial early stage infectious individuals 0.44
R0 Basic reproduction number 0.92
1/γ Mean latent period? 0.97
1/νe Mean early infectious period? 0.96
1/νp Mean progressed infectious period? 0.96
η Probability of death/infection fatality ratio (IFR) 0.0092
ρ Mean death detection rate 0.83
1/
√
φ Overdispersion in observed deaths 0.38
α0 intercept in the linear model of test positivity log-odds (5) 3.87
α1 slope in the linear model of test positivity log-odds (5) 0.83
1/
√
κ Overdispersion in test positivity 0.037
? Mean latent and infectious period durations are parameterized in weeks.
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Figure A1: Sample data set simulated for study. Observed cases and deaths were used with the actual number
of tests performed during April 14th to May 19th.
Table A2: Prior distributions for test-aware model.
Parameter Interpretation Prior Prior Median (90% Interval) Reference
S 0 Initial susceptible fraction Beta(983, 2.7) 1 − 2.4 × 10−3
(
1 − 6 × 10−3, 1 − 7.2 × 10−4
)
I˜0 Fraction of initial infected who are infectious Beta(41.3, 17.26) 0.71 (0..6, 0.8)
I˜e,0 Fraction of initial early stage infectious individuals Beta(24.43, 27.02) 0..47 (0..36, 0.59)
R0 Basic reproduction number Log-normal(-0.25, 0.7) 0.77 (0.25, 2.41)
1/γ Mean latent period? Log-normal(0, 0.22) 1 (0.7, 1.44)
1/νe Mean early infectious period? Log-normal(0, 0.22) 1 (0.7, 1.44)
1/νp Mean progressed infectious period? Log-normal(0, 0.22) 1 (0.7, 1.44)
η Probability of death/infection fatality ratio (IFR) Beta(1.5, 200) 0.006 (0.0009, 0.02)
ρ Mean death detection rate Beta(8, 2) 0.82 (0.57, 0.96)
1/
√
φ Overdispersion in observed deaths Exponential(1) 0.69 (0.05, 3)
α0 intercept in the linear model of test positivity log-odds (5) Truncated-normal(4, 2) 4.06 (1.07, 7.31)
α1 slope in the linear model of test positivity log-odds (5) Beta(3, 1) 3.91 (1.6, 6.2)
1/
√
κ Overdispersion in test positivity Exponential(1) 0.69 (0.05, 3)
? Mean latent and infectious period durations are parameterized in weeks.
?? These priors are used only for the initial model fit at the beginning of the epidemic. In models fit to later stages of the epidemic, method of
moments estimators are used to create a prior based on the posterior of the relevant compartments on the relevant day in the previous model.
Table A3: Prior Distributions for Model without Tests.
Parameter Interpretation Prior Prior Median (90% Interval) Reference
S 0 initial susceptible fraction Beta(983, 2.7) 1 − 2.4 × 10−3
(
1 − 6 × 10−3, 1 − 7.2 × 10−4
)
I˜0 Fraction of initial infected who are infectious Beta(41.3, 17.26) 0.71 (0..6, 0.8)
I˜e,0 Fraction of initial early stage infectious individuals Beta(24.43, 27.02) 0..47 (0..36, 0.59)
R0 Basic reproduction number Log-normal(-0.25, 0.7) 0.78 (0.25, 2.46)
1/γ Mean latent period? Log-normal(0, 0.22) 1 (.7, 1.44)
1/νe Mean early infectious period? Log-normal(0, 0.22) 1 (.7, 1.44)
1/νp Mean progressed infectious period? Log-normal(0, 0.22) 1 (.7, 1.44)
η Probability of death/infection fatality ratio (IFR) Beta(1.5, 200) 0.006 (0.0009, 0.02)
ρ Mean death detection rate Beta(8, 2) 0.82 (0.57, 0.96)
1/
√
φ Overdispersion in observed deaths Exponential(1) 0.69 (0.05, 3)
ρc Mean case detection rate Beta(5.62, 42.57) 0.11 (0..05, 0.2)
1/
√
φc Overdispersion in observed cases Exponential(1) 0.69 (0.05, 3)
? Mean latent and infectious period durations are parameterized in weeks.
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Figure A2: Relative absolute difference between median posterior and true parameter value from one thousand
simulations. Relative absolute difference is calculated as absolute difference divided by the true parameter
value. Both the test-aware used in the main analysis, as well as an alternative model which did not account for
the number of tests performed are compared.
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Figure A3: Relative credible interval width from one thousand simulations. Relative credible interval width
is calculated as width of 95% credible intervals divided by the true parameter value. Both the test-aware
model used in the main analysis, as well as an alternative model which did not account for the number of tests
performed are compared.
21
Parameter Test-Aware Coverage No Tests Coverage
S 0 100 100
I˜0 100 100
I˜e,0 100 100
R0 98 8
1/γ 100 100
1/νe 100 100
1/νp 100 100
η 100 99
ρ 100 100
1/
√
φ 96 93
α0 100 NA
α1 100 NA
1/
√
κ 95 NA
Table A4: Credible interval coverages for all model parameters.
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Figure A4: Summaries of prior and posterior distributions for all model parameters for the test-aware model
fitted to one simulated data set (Figure A1) from 4/14/2020-5/19/2020. Black dots represent medians, and black
lines are 95% credible intervals.
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Figure A5: Summaries of prior and posterior distributions for all model parameters for the No Tests model fitted
to one simulated data (Figure A1) set from 4/14/2020-5/19/2020. Black dots represent medians, and black lines
are 95% credible intervals.
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Figure B1: Summaries of prior and posterior distributions for all model parameters for the model fitted to data
from 3/21/2020-5/5/2020. Black dots represent medians, and black lines are 95% credible intervals.
B Posterior Summaries for all Model Parameters
In the main analysis we report some summaries of parameter posteriors, but did not have room in the main
results section to summarize every model parameter. We provide visual summaries of posteriors for all thirteen
model parameters for each time period in Figures B1, B2 and B3.
C Sensitivity analyses
We conducted four sensitivity analyses in order to see how our results changed depending on the specified
priors. In each additional analysis we changed only one prior from the main analysis. In two analyses we
changed the prior for R0 to be lognormal(log(2.5), .5) or lognormal(log(.53), .78). In two analyses we changed
the prior on the fraction of people who were initially infected so that the prior mean was either twice as large
or half as large as the mean used in the main analysis. In our model construction fraction of people initially
infected is equal to 1 minus fraction of people who are initially susceptible. Overall, we found that changing
the prior on R0 changed the magnitude of our inference on R0 somewhat, but generally didn’t affect key results.
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Posterior Summaries: Medians & 95% Credible Intervals for May 6 − Jun 10
Figure B2: Summaries of prior and posterior distributions for all model parameters for the model fitted to data
from 5/6/2020-6/10/2020. Black dots represent medians, and black lines are 95% credible intervals.
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Posterior Summaries: Medians & 95% Credible Intervals for Jun 11 − Jul 16
Figure B3: Summaries of prior and posterior distributions for all model parameters for the model fitted to data
from 6/11/2020-7/16/2020. Black dots represent medians, and black lines are 95% credible intervals.
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R0 ~ lognormal(log(2.5), .5)
Figure C.1: Prior and posterior distributions of the basic reproduction number (R0), infection-to-fatality ra-
tio (IFR), and parameters of the beta-binomial observational model for cases, α0, and α1. For each param-
eter, we report three posterior distributions corresponding to the three observation periods. The shaded ar-
eas are mirrored posterior density plots. Black circles correspond to prior/posterior medians. Black verti-
cal lines indicate 50%, 80%, and 95% Bayesian credible intervals. Sensitivity analysis for Figure 4 where
R0 ∼ lognormal(log(2.5), .5).
Changing the prior on the fraction of people who were initially infected changed our results on prevalence
noticeably, and highlights the importance of this prior in our model. The results of the sensitivity analyses are
shown in the figures below.
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Figure C.2: Prior and posterior distributions of the basic reproduction number (R0), infection-to-fatality ra-
tio (IFR), and parameters of the beta-binomial observational model for cases, α0, and α1. For each param-
eter, we report three posterior distributions corresponding to the three observation periods. The shaded ar-
eas are mirrored posterior density plots. Black circles correspond to prior/posterior medians. Black verti-
cal lines indicate 50%, 80%, and 95% Bayesian credible intervals. Sensitivity analysis for Figure 4 where
R0 ∼ lognormal(log(.53), .78).
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Figure C.3: Prior and posterior distributions of the basic reproduction number (R0), infection-to-fatality ratio
(IFR), and parameters of the beta-binomial observational model for cases, α0, and α1. For each parameter,
we report three posterior distributions corresponding to the three observation periods. The shaded areas are
mirrored posterior density plots. Black circles correspond to prior/posterior medians. Black vertical lines
indicate 50%, 80%, and 95% Bayesian credible intervals. Sensitivity analysis for Figure 4 where mean initial
infected is doubled.
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Figure C.4: Prior and posterior distributions of the basic reproduction number (R0), infection-to-fatality ratio
(IFR), and parameters of the beta-binomial observational model for cases, α0, and α1. For each parameter,
we report three posterior distributions corresponding to the three observation periods. The shaded areas are
mirrored posterior density plots. Black circles correspond to prior/posterior medians. Black vertical lines
indicate 50%, 80%, and 95% Bayesian credible intervals. Sensitivity analysis for Figure 4 where mean initial
infected is halved.
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Figure C.5: Latent and observed cumulative death (top row) and incidence (middle row) trajectories and latent
prevalence trajectories (bottom row) in Orange County, CA. Columns correspond to the three observation time
intervals. Solid blue lines show point-wise posterior medians, while shaded areas denote 50%, 80%, and 95%
Bayesian credible intervals. Black and gray bars denote observed/training and left-out/test data. Note that the
posterior predictive distributions are of latent deaths and cases are not forecasts of their observed counterparts.
Sensitivity analysis for Figure 5 where R0 ∼ lognormal(log(2.5), .5).
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Figure C.6: Latent and observed cumulative death (top row) and incidence (middle row) trajectories and latent
prevalence trajectories (bottom row) in Orange County, CA. Columns correspond to the three observation time
intervals. Solid blue lines show point-wise posterior medians, while shaded areas denote 50%, 80%, and 95%
Bayesian credible intervals. Black and gray bars denote observed/training and left-out/test data. Note that the
posterior predictive distributions are of latent deaths and cases are not forecasts of their observed counterparts.
Sensitivity analysis for Figure 5 where R0 ∼ lognormal(log(.53), .78).
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Figure C.7: Latent and observed cumulative death (top row) and incidence (middle row) trajectories and latent
prevalence trajectories (bottom row) in Orange County, CA. Columns correspond to the three observation time
intervals. Solid blue lines show point-wise posterior medians, while shaded areas denote 50%, 80%, and 95%
Bayesian credible intervals. Black and gray bars denote observed/training and left-out/test data. Note that the
posterior predictive distributions are of latent deaths and cases are not forecasts of their observed counterparts.
Sensitivity analysis for Figure 5 where mean initial infected is doubled.
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Figure C.8: Latent and observed cumulative death (top row) and incidence (middle row) trajectories and latent
prevalence trajectories (bottom row) in Orange County, CA. Columns correspond to the three observation time
intervals. Solid blue lines show point-wise posterior medians, while shaded areas denote 50%, 80%, and 95%
Bayesian credible intervals. Black and gray bars denote observed/training and left-out/test data. Note that the
posterior predictive distributions are of latent deaths and cases are not forecasts of their observed counterparts.
Sensitivity analysis for Figure 5 where mean initial infected is halved.
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Figure C.9: Death (top row) and positivity fraction (bottom row) posterior predictive distributional summaries
and forecasts. Sensitivity analysis for Figure 6 where R0 ∼ lognormal(log(2.5), .5).
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Figure C.10: Death (top row) and positivity fraction (bottom row) posterior predictive distributional summaries
and forecasts. Sensitivity analysis for Figure 6 where R0 ∼ lognormal(log(.53), .78).
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Figure C.11: Death (top row) and positivity fraction (bottom row) posterior predictive distributional summaries
and forecasts. Sensitivity analysis for Figure 6 where mean initial infected is doubled.
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Figure C.12: Death (top row) and positivity fraction (bottom row) posterior predictive distributional summaries
and forecasts. Sensitivity analysis for Figure 6 where mean initial infected is halved.
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Posterior Summaries: Medians & 95% Credible Intervals for Mar 31 − May 5
Figure C.13: Summaries of prior and posterior distributions for all model parameters for the model fitted to data
from 3/21/2020-5/5/2020. Black dots represent medians, and black lines are 95% credible intervals. Sensitivity
analysis for Figure B1 where R0 ∼ lognormal(log(2.5), .5).
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Posterior Summaries: Medians & 95% Credible Intervals for Mar 31 − May 5
Figure C.14: Summaries of prior and posterior distributions for all model parameters for the model fitted to data
from 3/21/2020-5/5/2020. Black dots represent medians, and black lines are 95% credible intervals. Sensitivity
analysis for Figure B1 where R0 ∼ lognormal(log(.53), .78).
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Posterior Summaries: Medians & 95% Credible Intervals for Mar 31 − May 5
Figure C.15: Summaries of prior and posterior distributions for all model parameters for the model fitted to data
from 3/21/2020-5/5/2020. Black dots represent medians, and black lines are 95% credible intervals. Sensitivity
analysis for Figure B1 where mean initial infected is doubled.
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Figure C.16: Summaries of prior and posterior distributions for all model parameters for the model fitted to data
from 3/21/2020-5/5/2020. Black dots represent medians, and black lines are 95% credible intervals. Sensitivity
analysis for Figure B1 where mean initial infected is halved.
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Posterior Summaries: Medians & 95% Credible Intervals for May 6 − Jun 10
Figure C.17: Summaries of prior and posterior distributions for all model parameters for the model fitted to data
from 5/6/2020-6/10/2020. Black dots represent medians, and black lines are 95% credible intervals. Sensitivity
analysis for Figure B2 where R0 ∼ lognormal(log(2.5), .5).
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Figure C.18: Summaries of prior and posterior distributions for all model parameters for the model fitted to data
from 5/6/2020-6/10/2020. Black dots represent medians, and black lines are 95% credible intervals. Sensitivity
analysis for Figure B2 where R0 ∼ lognormal(log(.53), .78).
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Figure C.19: Summaries of prior and posterior distributions for all model parameters for the model fitted to data
from 5/6/2020-6/10/2020. Black dots represent medians, and black lines are 95% credible intervals. Sensitivity
analysis for Figure B2 where mean initial infected is doubled.
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Figure C.20: Summaries of prior and posterior distributions for all model parameters for the model fitted to data
from 5/6/2020-6/10/2020. Black dots represent medians, and black lines are 95% credible intervals. Sensitivity
analysis for Figure B2 where mean initial infected is halved.
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Posterior Summaries: Medians & 95% Credible Intervals for Jun 11 − Jul 16
Figure C.21: Summaries of prior and posterior distributions for all model parameters for the model fitted to
data from 6/11/2020-7/16/2020. Black dots represent medians, and black lines are 95% credible intervals.
Sensitivity analysis for Figure B3 where R0 ∼ lognormal(log(2.5), .5).
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Figure C.22: Summaries of prior and posterior distributions for all model parameters for the model fitted to
data from 6/11/2020-7/16/2020. Black dots represent medians, and black lines are 95% credible intervals.
Sensitivity analysis for Figure B3 where R0 ∼ lognormal(log(.53), .78).
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Figure C.23: Summaries of prior and posterior distributions for all model parameters for the model fitted to
data from 6/11/2020-7/16/2020. Black dots represent medians, and black lines are 95% credible intervals.
Sensitivity analysis for Figure B3 where where mean initial infected is doubled.
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Figure C.24: Summaries of prior and posterior distributions for all model parameters for the model fitted to
data from 6/11/2020-7/16/2020. Black dots represent medians, and black lines are 95% credible intervals.
Sensitivity analysis for Figure B3 where where mean initial infected is doubled.
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